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Abstract
The eﬀects of an agreement such as the Kyoto Protocol, which implicitly imposes a ceiling
on the stock of pollution, have recently been studied in Hotelling models. We add pollution
and a ceiling to the endogenous growth model of Tsur and Zemel (2005) to study the eﬀects
of the ceiling on capital accumulation and research investments. The ceiling increases the
scarcity of the exhaustible resource in the short run, which boosts backstop utilization.
This implies that R&D becomes more beneﬁcial compared with capital accumulation.
How the short run development path of an economy is aﬀected depends on its capital
endowment or richness, respectively. Only economies which are neither too rich nor too
poor may invest more into research. In the long run an economy with a ceiling follows
basically the same long run development path as an economy without the ceiling.
Keywords: Endogenous growth, Environmental agreements, Fossil fuels, Nonrenewable
resources, Research and Development
1. Introduction
Climate change has been one of the major issues both in public and academic discus-
sion in recent decades. A wide range of nations agreed in the Kyoto Protocol to limit
climate change. The best known political goal is the 2◦C climate target which allows
for long-run global temperature increase of 2◦C above pre-industrial level. This target
had been a subject to political and scientiﬁc discussion and was ﬁnally endorsed by the
United Nation Conference of the Parties in Cancun in 2010.1 The supporters of the cli-
mate target agree that the consequences of climate change remain manageable as long as
the global temperature increase does not exceed 2◦C. According to Graßl et al. (2003)
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the 2◦C climate target translates into a maximum CO2 concentration of 400 - 450ppm.
Hansen et al. (2008) advocate a maximum CO2 concentration of 350ppm to preserve the
planet as it was during the development of civilization. Regardless of one follows the 2◦C
climate target or Hansen et al. (2008), both implicitly impose a ceiling on the stock of
CO2. Since other agreements follow a similar approach, e.g. the Montreal Protocol on
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, it seems likely that a successor of the Kyoto
Protocol will include an implicit or explicit ceiling on the stock of CO2. One of the main
sources of CO2 emissions are fossil fuels. Therefore, a ceiling on the CO2 concentration
might have a signiﬁcant impact on the energy generation of the economy.
Chakravorty et al. (2006a) was motivated by the described problem to analyze the ef-
fects of a ceiling on the stock of CO2, or more generally pollution. Further works in this
literature strand are Chakravorty et al. (2006b), Chakravorty et al. (2008), Chakravorty
et al. (2012) and Laﬀorgue et al. (2008). This literature analyzes how a ceiling on the
stock of pollution changes the optimal resource utilization path. A Hotelling model with
polluting exhaustible resources and a renewable non-polluting resource serves as the basic
framework, which is augmented in several ways. Abatement activities are considered by
Chakravorty et al. (2006a) and Laﬀorgue et al. (2008). Chakravorty et al. (2008) focus
on the consequences of two diﬀerently polluting exhaustible resources. Chakravorty et al.
(2012) extend the model of Chakravorty et al. (2006a) by technological progress, which is
caused by a learning-by-doing eﬀect and decreases the costs of the backstop. It is shown
that the optimal resource utilization path depends on the cost structure established by
the standard assumption of the Hotelling model and the assumption related to the speciﬁc
augmentation. Owning to its Hotelling based structure, the literature fails to consider
capital or research activities, which are both determinants of economic growth, structural
change and changes of the energy mix as shown by Tsur and Zemel (2005). R&D in
particular seems to be a non-negligible factor, as it is the driving force behind a steadily
positive growth rate in many endogenous growth models, e.g. Rivera-Batiz and Romer
(1991).2 Therefore, this paper strives to analyze the eﬀects of a ceiling on the stock of
pollution in an economy incorporating a polluting exhaustible resource and a backstop as
well as capital and research driven technological progress. For this purpose we augment
2A comprehensive review of the endogenous growth theory is given by Aghion et al. (1998) and Barro
and Sala-i Martin (2003).
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the suitable endogenous growth model of Tsur and Zemel (2005) with both pollution and
a ceiling on the stock of pollution. Utilization of the two resources occasions costs. In
contrast to the usual assumption of endogenous growth models, technological progress
does not augment the productivity of resources or capital, but reduces the costs associ-
ated with the use of the backstop. With regard to energy generation, the chosen modeling
constitutes the more realistic approach. For clariﬁcation we refer to Stiglitz (1974). By
modifying Solow's neoclassical growth model, Stiglitz shows that sustainable economic
development is compatible with exhaustible resources or fossil fuels, respectively, if tech-
nology, which enhances the resource's productivity, increases suﬃciently fast.3 However,
the result rests upon the assumption that a vast amount of goods can be produced by
a vanishingly low amount of fossil fuel, and suﬃciently advanced technology. Without
renewable energies, which are not considered by Stiglitz (1974), fossil fuels are the only
energy source. However, thermodynamics require some minimum stake of energy for ev-
ery production process.4 In this light, the assumption of Tsur and Zemel (2005) seems
more realistic. Other features from the Hotelling models, such as abatement or diﬀerently
polluting exhaustible resources, are left for further research, in order to keep the analysis
as simple as possible.
In the present paper we show that the social optimum consists of three time periods (or
phases) which appear in the Hotelling models in a similar manner. As in Chakravorty
et al. (2006a), the only possible sequence containing all three time periods starts with a
non-binding ceiling which becomes binding later on. After a phase with a binding ceiling,
the ceiling becomes non-binding again and will stay it forever. Thus, neither capital nor
research can explain other sequences. However, research reduces the costs of the backstop.
As long as the backstop is used, the unit costs of the backstop determine the energy price
as well as the marginal costs of the last used unit of exhaustible resources. Technological
progress implies therefore a reduction of both. Together with changing energy demand,
caused by the variable capital stock, and in contrast to Chakravorty et al. (2006a), the
model can explain a decreasing scarcity rent of the exhaustible resource endogenously. By
analyzing the development during the three phases and taking the only possible sequence
into account, we can describe the optimal path of the economy. The development of
3See Solow (1956).
4Compare Meyer et al. (1998), page 171.
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the economy depends on its state described by capital stock and technology. Due to the
ceiling the scarcity of the exhaustible resource is increased above its "natural" level, i.e.
the level without the ceiling. This "additional" scarcity increases the number of capital-
technology combinations with the optimality of research instead of capital accumulation
in the ﬁrst two phases. Since the economy must be described by one of this capital-
technology combinations, which change from the optimality of capital accumulation to
the one of research, to be aﬀected, we call the eﬀect of the ceiling an increase of R&D
incentives. During the phase with a binding ceiling the additional scarcity and therefore
also the excess incentives are eliminated. In the long run, i.e. in the last phase, the ceiling
will be never reached. Thus, there is no additional scarcity and the economy develops as
the unconstrained one of Tsur and Zemel (2005). Hence, the constrained economy will
basically follow the same long run development path as the unconstrained economy. To
sum up, we show how the ceiling aﬀects capital accumulation and research activities and
give an endogenous explanation for decreasing scarcity rents of the exhaustible resource.
To complete the discussion, we decentralize the social optimum in a competitive market.
The analysis is based upon a neoclassical framework with price-taking composite product
manufacturers and individuals, as well as Cournot competition on the resource market
between two resource owning companies. Neither the individuals nor the companies take
their inﬂuence on the emission stock into account. Therefore, the exhaustible resource
has to be taxed in the short run. In the long run, the tax is not needed due to the high
scarcity of the resource. To adjust for market power eﬀects resulting from the Cournot
competition both resources must be subsidized at all times.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 gives a description of the model. The
social optimum is described in section 3. The market economy and government interven-
tions necessary for the social optimum are discussed in section 4. Section 5 concludes the
discussion.
2. Model
We augment the endogenous growth model of Tsur and Zemel (2005) with a pollution
stock and a ceiling on the stock of pollution. For that purpose we describe the model
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structure of Tsur and Zemel (2005) brieﬂy.5 A single composite good Y is produced
by using capital K and energy x according to the well behaved production function
Y = F (K, x), with F (0, x) = F (K, 0) = 0, FK > 0, Fx > 0, FKK < 0, Fxx < 0,
FKx = FxK > 0 and J = FKKFxx − F 2Kx > 0. To avoid a collapse of production, the
assumptions lim
K→0
FK = ∞ and lim
x→0
Fx = ∞ are added. Energy is generated by a one
to one transformation of an exhaustible resource R (fossil fuel) or a backstop (e.g. solar
energy) b, i.e. x = R+ b. The costs of supplying resources are M(R) in the case of fossil
fuel and MbB(A)b in the case of the backstop. The fossil fuel extraction cost function
is increasing and strictly convex, i.e. M ′(R) > 0 and M ′′(R) > 0. Furthermore, we
assume that no ﬁxed costs exists M(0) = 0 and that the marginal costs of the ﬁrst
supplied unit are zero M ′(0) = 0. The backstop cost function is composed of a ﬁxed
cost parameter Mb > 0 and a function B(A), with B(A) > 0 ∀A > 0.6 The latter
reﬂects the inﬂuence of technology A on the backstop unit costs. We assume that unit
costs decline with technology but that the eﬀect vanishes for large A, i.e. B′(A) < 0,
lim
A→∞
B(A) = B¯ > 0 and lim
A→∞
B′(A) = 0. Furthermore, the technology endowment A0
is positive and B′(A) diﬀerentiable with B′′(A) > 0. The net income is given at each
point in time by Y n = F (K, x)−M(R)−MbB(A)b and can be used for consumption C,
physical capital (dis)investment K˙ or research I. Capital stock develops according to
K˙ = F (K, x)− C −M(R)−MbB(A)b− I. (1)
Technology A increases in research investment I in compliance with
A˙ = I. (2)
R&D investments are limited by the net income, i.e. I ∈ [0, Y n]. Hereafter the upper
bound is represented by I¯. As long as fossil fuel is used, the resource stock SR, with the
initial value SR0 , decreases according to
S˙R = −R. (3)
At every point in time the representative household exhibits a strictly concave utility func-
tion U(C) which increases in consumption with lim
C→0
U ′(C) =∞. To avoid the optimality
5We refer to Tsur and Zemel (2005) for details. Deviations from Tsur and Zemel (2005) are indi-
cated explicitly. For the sake of simplicity time index t is suppressed. It is only added, if needed for
understanding.
6Tsur and Zemel (2005) assume Mb = 1.
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of C = 0, we also assume U(0) = −∞.7 Therefore, the utility is given by
U(C)
≥ 0, for C > 0,= −∞, for C = 0. (4)
Following Chakravorty et al. (2006a) and the other Hotelling models mentioned above,
utilization of fossil fuel causes pollution E.8 By appropriate unit choice we can set R = E.
Thus, R and E are used synonymously. The stock of pollution is SE, while its initial value
is denoted by SE0 . With γ being the natural regeneration rate, SE develops according to
9
S˙E = E − γSE. (5)
The ceiling S¯E is imposed exogenously, for example by an political decision.10 Then
S¯E − SE ≥ 0 must hold at every point in time. Due to the ceiling, it is possible to divide
the complete planning period into three time phases depending on the ceiling's status.
Phase 1 is characterized by a non-binding ceiling. In phase 2 the ceiling is binding for a
limited time period. In phase 3 the ceiling is non-binding and stays that forever.
3. Social Optimum
In the following section we derive the (constrained) social optimum. Thus, we assume
that a constrained social planner maximizes the utility over the complete planning period
given the initial state (K0, A0, SR0 , SE0) and subject to (1), (2), (3), (5), S¯E − SE ≥ 0,
K ≥ 0, SR ≥ 0, 0 ≤ I ≤ I¯ and E, b, C ∈ [0,∞[.11 The present value of utility is given by
7Due to lim
K→0
FK =∞ and (15) a decreasing capital stock is accompanied by increasing consumption.
Therefore, K = 0 and C = 0 could be reached in ﬁnite time, if the assumption U(0) = −∞ is not made.
8While it is reasonable to assume that pollution has negative eﬀects on utility and/or production, we
follow Chakravorty et al. (2006a), Chakravorty et al. (2006b), Chakravorty et al. (2008), Chakravorty
et al. (2012), Laﬀorgue et al. (2008) and neglect these eﬀects to concentrate on the eﬀect of a ceiling on
pollution and to keep the model as simple as possible. This implies that there are no marginal costs of
pollution.
9This form is widely used in the literature. E.g. by Guruswamy Babu et al. (1997) and Tsur and
Zemel (2009).
10The political decision can be both an election outcome or the result of an international agreement.
Chakravorty et al. (2006a), Chakravorty et al. (2012) and Chakravorty et al. (2008) refer to the latter.
According to Chakravorty et al. (2008) and Laﬀorgue et al. (2008) the ceiling may also reﬂect a damage
function that impose zero (or negligible) damages below the ceiling but prohibitive high damages above
it. The ceiling can also be imposed by some regulatory authority, as stated by Chakravorty et al. (2006a)
and Chakravorty et al. (2008). Since the ongoing international climate negotiations refer mainly to the
2◦C climate target, Eichner and Pethig (2013) use also a ceiling in their analysis of unilateral climate
policy.
11Following Chakravorty et al. (2008) and Chakravorty et al. (2012) we refer to the social planer has
a constrained one, since utility is maximized subject to the exogenously given ceiling. Thus, we are not
going to determine whether the ceiling is optimal or not but to analyze the optimal solution given the
ceiling.
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∫∞
0
U(C)e−ρtdt, with ρ as the time preference rate. Thus, with λ, κ, τ and θ representing
the current-value costate variables of K, A, SR and SE, and µ representing the Lagrange
multiplier associated with the ceiling, the current-value Lagrangian is12
L = U(C)+λ [F (K, b+R)− C −M(E)−MbB(A)b− I]
+ κI − τE + θ[E − γSE]− µ[E − γSE]. (6)
Analogous to Tsur and Zemel (2005), an interior optimum is given by the following nec-
essary conditions:13
∂L
∂C
= UC − λ = 0, (7)
∂L
∂E
= λ[Fx −M ′]− τ + θ − µ = 0, (8)
∂L
∂b
= λ[Fx −MbB(A)] = 0. (9)
The total energy supply, as well as the energy mix can be determined graphically by
means of (8) and (9). In Fig. 1 the marginal productivity of energy is given by Fx(K, x),
while MbB(A) represents the marginal costs of backstop.14 M ′(E) +
τ−θ+µ
λ
denotes the
marginal extraction costs of fossil fuel plus the term mq := τ−θ+µ
λ
which sets the costate
variable related to fossil fuel into relation to the shadow price of capital. Therefore,
mq is called the relative scarcity index in the following. If marginal backstop costs are
suﬃciently high, i.e. MbB(A) > M ′(E#) + mq, only fossil fuel are used and energy
utilization x = E# is given by Fx(K,E#) = M ′(E#) +mq. Energy generation relies only
on backstop, if the marginal backstop costs fall short of the sum of the marginal extraction
costs of the ﬁrst fossil fuel unit and the relative scarcity index M ′(0) +mq. Energy input
is then determined by MbB(A) = Fx(K, x). If marginal backstop costs lie between the
two extremes like illustrated in Fig. 1, i.e. M ′(0) + mq < MbB(A) < M ′(E#) + mq,
both energy sources are used and total energy utilization is given by Fx = MbB(A). In
this case MbB(A) = M ′(E) + mq determine the share of fossil fuel. The amount of used
12Notice that there are two mathematically approaches to solve a dynamic optimization problem with
state space constraints. We apply here the approach which Chiang (1992), p. 298 et seqq. calls the
"alternative approach" and Feichtinger and Hartl (1986), p. 164 et seqq. the "indirekte Methode".
13It can be shown that the suﬃcient conditions hold as long as B′′(A) ≥ Mbb (B′(A))2
[
1
M ′′(R) − FKKJ
]
.
Due to B′′(A) > 0, M ′′(R) > 0 and FKKJ < 0 both sides of the inequality are positive. As long as the
backstop is used, which is assumed, the inequality holds if Mb is suﬃciently small.
14A similar ﬁgure with θ = µ = 0 can be found in Tsur and Zemel (2005), p. 488. Thus, the ﬁgure of
Tsur and Zemel (2005) is a special case of Fig. 1.
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backstop equals the diﬀerence x − E. Following Tsur and Zemel (2005) we assume that
both resources are used.15
In the following, the index ∗ denotes optimal values, while unmarked variables denote
Figure 1: Usage of exhaustible resource and backstop
values of any possible path. The maximization of (6) with respect to the R&D investments
I gives
I∗ = 0, if− λ+ κ < 0,
0 ≤ I∗ ≤ I¯ , if− λ+ κ = 0, (10)
I∗ = I¯ , if− λ+ κ > 0.
15Notice that both resources can be used simultaneously, since the extraction costs of fossil fuel are
increasing in fossil fuel utilization. If the extraction costs are independent of R or zero, like in Hoel
(2011), a simultaneous use of both resources is not possible.
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Depending on the relation of κ to λ, R&D investments are minimal, singular or maximal.
The costate variables grow according to
∂L
∂K
= λFK = ρλ− λ˙, (11)
∂L
∂SE
= −θγ + µγ = ρθ − θ˙, (12)
∂L
∂SR
= 0 = ρτ − τ˙ , (13)
∂L
∂A
= −λMbbB′ = ρκ− κ˙. (14)
Combining (11) with (7) establishes the well-known Ramsey - rule
Cˆ =
FK − ρ
η
. (15)
The rule states that the growth rate of consumption Cˆ is positive as long as the marginal
product of capital is higher than the time preference rate. Consumption reacts the stronger
to the diﬀerence the smaller the positive elasticity of marginal utility (η) is.
The complementary slackness condition is given by
∂L
∂µ
= −E + γSE ≥ 0, µ ≥ 0, µ∂L
∂µ
= 0,
S¯E − SE ≥ 0, µ[S¯E − SE] = 0, (16)
ρµ− µ˙ ≥ 0, [= 0 if S¯E − SE > 0].
To complete the equation system the transversality conditions
(a) lim
t→∞
e−ρtλ(t) [K(t)−K∗(t)] ≥ 0, (b) lim
t→∞
e−ρtτ(t) [SR(t)− S∗R(t)] ≥ 0,
(c) lim
t→∞
e−ρtθ(t) [SE(t)− S∗E(t)] ≥ 0, (d) lim
t→∞
e−ρtκ(t) [A(t)− A∗(t)] ≥ 0 (17)
are needed.
Before analyzing the three phases it is useful to determine the possible sequences of
phases. In Appendix A.1 it is shown that the only sequence containing all three phases
starts with a non-binding ceiling, i.e. in phase 1. At the end of phase 1, at t = t1, the
ceiling becomes binding, so that the economy switches into phase 2, and stays binding for a
limited time period. At the moment t = t2 the ceiling becomes non-binding again and the
economy switches into phase 3. Thus, the ceiling stays non-binding for all following points
in time. This sequence of phases was already found by Chakravorty et al. (2006a). Thus,
the introduction of capital and R&D cannot explain other sequences. Furthermore, the
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switch from one phase to the next is smooth, i.e. the development paths of consumption,
backstop and fossil fuel utilization, technology and capital do not exhibit discontinuities.
The sign of θ during phase 1 can be easily explained by its interpretation as the shadow
price of the emission stock. An external marginal increase of the stock narrows the problem
of the social planner. Therefore, the increase has a negative value, which implies θ < 0 in
phase 1. Phase 3 was characterized by an emission stock that will never reach the ceiling.
Since we abstain from direct eﬀects of pollution on utility or production, the emission
stock has no relevance for the constrained social planer.16 θ = 0 follows directly. With a
binding ceiling θ cannot be interpreted as a shadow price.17 However, in Appendix A.1
we show that θ is continuous at t = t2. Together with θ = 0 during phase 3, we get that
θ equals zero at the end of phase 2. (12) implies that θ decreases constantly, if θ(t) < 0
holds for point in time during phase 2. Since this contradicts θ(t2) = 0, a binding ceiling
implies θ > 0.
Proposition 1 The development of consumption, capital, technology, backstop and fossil
fuel utilization is continuous. The only sequence containing all three phases begins with
phase 1, switches over to phase 2 and ends with phase 3.
3.1. The phases
In this section we turn to the analysis of the three phases. In phase 3 the ceiling is never
reached so that µ = θ = 0, which implies the identity of phase 3 with an unconstrained
economy described by Tsur and Zemel (2005).18 Since Tsur and Zemel (2005) are also
one basis for our model, the analysis starts with phase 3 before we turn to phase 1 and 2.
3.1.1. Phase 3 - the long run
As phase 3 is identical with the economy of Tsur and Zemel (2005), the following
remarks are limited to the extent that is necessary for understanding. For proofs, as
well as for more detailed explanations, we refer to Tsur and Zemel (2005). As mentioned
above, phase 3 is characterized by θ = µ = 0 so that the relative scarcity index reads
mq3 :=
τ
λ
. Due to (11) and (13) the growth rate of mq3 is given by mˆ
q
3 = FK > 0. Thus,
16Notice that this does not mean that pollution is irrelevant for the economy or that the ceiling is set
to low. Environmental concerns, like the damage function mentioned in footnote 10, are reﬂected by the
ceiling. Since the ceiling is exogenously given, it goes beyond the scope of this paper if it is reﬂecting the
environmental concerns correctly.
17See Feichtinger and Hartl (1986), p. 175-176. According to Feichtinger and Hartl (1986), p. 171, θ
equals the sum of the shadow price of the emission stock and µ during phase 2.
18µ = 0 follows directly from (16).
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mq3 steadily increases in time. If, as assumed, both resources are used, (8) and (9) give
Fx(K, x(K,A)) = M
′(E(A)) +
τ
λ
= MbB(A). (18)
(18) determines b(K,A), E(A) and x(K,A). The optimal R&D investments are given
by (10). Thus, the optimization problem reduces to the task of identifying optimal con-
sumption and capital accumulation for every point in time. Tsur and Zemel (2005) show
that this can be done by comparing the position of the economy in the three-dimensional
technology-capital-time space with two characteristic manifolds (planes).19 The time-
dimension reﬂects the development of the scarcity index and therefore of the energy mix.
As can be seen in Fig. 1 the higher the scarcity index the higher is the backstop share
ceteris paribus.
The ﬁrst plane describe all points in the A,K, t space which allow the steady state
C˙ = K˙ = A˙ = 0. Therefore, we refer to it as the steady state plane (SSP). It is given
by the steady state, (7) and (11), which imply FK(K, x(K,A)) − ρ = 0. The plane is
increasing in A but is independent from time, as FK(K, x(K,A)) depends on total energy
but not on the energy mix. Consumption increases (decreases) below (above) the SSP.
The second plane describes all points where singular R&D is optimal and is therefore
called the singular plane (SiP). Only above the SiP maximal R&D is optimal, while be-
low it no research can be conducted. The plane is given by the no-arbitrage condition with
respect to net production between investments into the capital stock and into technology,
i.e. by ∂Y
n
∂A
= ∂Y
n
∂K
. The SiP increases in technology but decreases in time (scarcity) as
long as SR > 0. If the resource stock is exhausted it is independent from time. The
interpretation of the SiP decline in time is straightforward. As the increasing scarcity
implies a higher share of backstop, the eﬀect of a technology increase on net production
strengthen while the eﬀect of capital accumulation remains unchanged. Thus, R&D (cap-
ital accumulation) becomes feasible for more (less) A,K combinations. This process could
be interpreted as an increase of R&D advantageousness, and will play a major role in the
following discussion of the other two phases and economic development over the whole
time. Both planes SiP and SSP are illustrated in Fig. 2, with TR denoting the point in
time SR becomes exhausted.
Tsur and Zemel (2005) show that the economy approaches the SiP or the SSP with either
19Although "manifold" is mathematically correct, we use the term "plane" in the following, as it is
more descriptive.
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Figure 2: Singular- and steady state plane in the A,K, t space
maximal or minimal R&D, i.e. on a most rapid approach path (MRAP). If located above
the SiP, the economy converges against the SiP with maximal R&D or against the SSP
(i. exception) with minimal R&D. Below the SiP the economy conducts no research and
accumulates capital to reach the SiP or reduces capital to reach the SSP (ii. exception).
Once reached, the economy conducts singular R&D on the SiP for ever, or switches into
a steady state at the intersection of SSP and SiP for SR = 0, if the SiP lies above the SSP
for huge A. Thus, positive R&D investments are only feasible above or on the SiP, while
capital can only accumulate on or below the SiP.
3.1.2. Phase 1
Phase 1 is characterized by a non-binding ceiling that becomes binding in the future.
Thus, from (16) we get µ = 0. Since the ceiling becomes binding later on, changes of the
emission stock are valued by the social planner by θ < 0, as shown before. By using θ1
to indicate the phase the shadow price belongs to, we get from (8) the variant of phase 1
for (18):
Fx(K, x(K,A)) = M
′(E(A)) +
τ − θ1
λ
= MbB(A). (19)
The relative scarcity index mq1 is now given by
τ+|θ1|
λ
and its growth rate reads
mˆq1 = FK + γ
|θ1|
χ
, with χ := τ + |θ1|. (20)
Ceteris paribus, the scarcity index is both higher and increasing faster then in an economy
without the ceiling, i.e. with the same A,K combination and the same costate variables
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but without θ1. In the following, such an economy is called unbounded. As the scarcity
index τ
λ
of an unbounded economy reﬂects the pure relative scarcity of fossil fuel, we
refer to it as the natural scarcity. During phase 1 the additional scarcity |θ1|
λ
, caused
by the ceiling, adds to the natural one. Fig. 1 implies that the additional scarcity
boosts backstop utilization and reduces fossil fuel use while leaving total energy input x
unchanged. As stated in section 3.1.1 the higher backstop utilization implies a greater
eﬀect of an increasing technology on net production. Therefore, R&D instead of capital
accumulation becomes feasible for more A,K combinations implying an increase in R&D
advantageousness, i.e. a SiP that is both lying below and decreasing faster in time then
the SiP of an unbounded economy. As shown in section 3.1.1, the SSP is not aﬀected by
scarcity. Therefore, the additional scarcity has no eﬀect on the SSP.
The development program is not aﬀected by the ceiling. However, the economy cannot
be in phase 1 for ever. If it were, the emission stock converges to the ceiling for t → ∞.
This implies lim
t→∞
E(t) = γS¯E and therefore the exhaustion of SR in ﬁnite time. But with
SR = 0 the emission stock decreases to zero, contradicting a forever binding ceiling. Thus,
the economy cannot reach the steady state at the intersection of SSP and SiP for SR = 0
during phase 1. Only the two exceptions form section 3.1.1 remain for reaching a steady
state.
Proposition 2 During phase 1 the prospectively binding ceiling adds an additional scarcity
to the natural one and is therefore increasing the R&D advantageousness. Compared with
an unbounded economy the R&D advantageouness is both higher and increasing faster.
3.1.3. Phase 2
During phase 2 the ceiling is binding. (16) implies µ2 > 0. As stated above θ > 0
during phase 2. To indicate the phase we use the notation θ2 and µ2. (8) is rewritten to
form the variant of phase 2 for (18):
Fx(K, x(K,A)) = M
′(E¯) +
τ − θ2 + µ2
λ
= MbB(A). (21)
The relative scarcity index is given by mq2 :=
τ−θ2+µ2
λ
. According to Feichtinger and Hartl
(1986), p. 171, θ2 equals the sum of the shadow price of the emission stock and µ2. As
the shadow price of the emission stock is negative, µ2(t)− θ2(t) ≥ 0.20 Thus, the relative
scarcity index mq2 is higher than in an unbounded economy. Thus, in phase 2 there is
20A marginal exogenous decrease of the emission stock has a positive value for the constrained social
planer.
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still an additional scarcity, which implies that the R&D advantageousness is higher then
in an unbounded economy. However, the growth rate mˆq2 is ambiguous, because no exact
information is given about µˆ2 in (16):
mˆq2 = FK + γ −
µ2
ψ
[ρ− µˆ2]− γ τ
ψ
, with ψ := τ + |θ2|+ µ2. (22)
To obtain more information about the development of mq2 and therefore also about the
development of the R&D advantageousness, we use the binding ceiling. It implies that
the fossil fuel utilization is ﬁxed at E = E¯ = γS¯E. Fig. 1 shows how the binding ceiling
restricts the possible changes of mq2. Let be E¯ equal E(K,A) from the ﬁgure. If the
marginal backstop costs remain unchanged, i.e. if no research is conducted, the ﬁxed
fossil fuel amount implies a ﬁxed scarcity index. On the other hand, if R&D is conducted
and therefore technology A increasing, the marginal backstop costs are lowered. To ensure
E = E¯, the scarcity index mq2 needs to decrease, too. Otherwise, fossil fuel utilization
decreases violating the assumption of a binding ceiling during phase 2. Thus, the binding
ceiling establishes a link between R&D investments and the relative scarcity index. As long
as R&D is minimal the relative scarcity index and therefore the R&D advantageousness
remain unchanged in time. Generally, the economy needs to be located below the SiP to
ensure minimal R&D. On the other hand, positive R&D investments are only possible,
if the economy is located above or on the SiP. In this case, the scarcity index decreases
implying a decrease of R&D advantageousness. The reason will be discussed as a part of
the following section 3.2.
As in the other two phases, neither the SSP nor the development program are aﬀected
by the ceiling. The former is independent from the scarcity index. The latter one is not
aﬀected, because the economy cannot stay in phase 2 forever.21 Therefore, the steady state
at the intersection of SSP and SiP for SR = 0 is ruled out and only the two exceptions
from 3.1.1 are left.
Proposition 3 Due to the constant resource input E¯, the ceiling establishes a link be-
tween R&D activities and the R&D advantageousness. R&D advantageousness remains
unchanged if R&D investments are minimal and decreases in time if R&D investments
are positive. Compared with an unbounded economy R&D advantageousness is higher.
21Otherwise, E(t) = γS¯E implies the exhaustion of SR in ﬁnite time and therefore the violation of
SE = S¯E . Thus, the economy has to switch from phase 2 to phase 3 at some later point in time.
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3.2. Optimal development
To analyze the development over the whole planning period [0,∞] it is necessary to
join the analysis of the three phases. For this purpose we use the relative scarcity indices
mq1, m
q
2 and m
q
3. Furthermore, the smooth transition from one phase to the next must be
noticed. Therefore, the SiP and SSP of the three phases can be attached to each other.
Since the SSP is independent of time t, it is identical to the one described in section 3.1.1.
The SiP decreases in time during phase 1 and during phase 3 as long as SR > 0. In phase
2 it is either constant or increasing in time. Since an increasing SiP requires singular or
maximal R&D investments, there are two more, mixed possibilities. The ﬁrst one appears
if the development path approaches the SiP from below, i.e. the economy is accumulating
capital to realize the research option. In this case, the SiP remains unchanged until the
path reaches it and increases afterwards. In the second case, maximal R&D investments
are reduced to minimal investments before the SiP is reached, i.e. the economy converges
to a steady state. Then the SiP increases at the beginning of the phase and remains
unchanged at the end. Figure 3 illustrates the two border cases of a completely unchanged
and a steadily increasing SiP in the A,K, t space. The development of the SiP is closely
Figure 3: SSP and SiP with no or maximal R&D in Phase 2
related to the relative scarcity indices, since a higher index corresponds with a lower SiP,
and therefore with a higher R&D advantageousness. Figure 4 shows how the development
of the index in time must look like to generate the both SiP variants of Fig. 3. As
stated in section 3.1.2, the relative scarcity index of phase 1 (mq1) both lies above and
grows faster than its equivalent of an unbounded economy, implying a higher and faster
growing R&D advantageousness. The driving force behind the increase of mq3 =
τ
λ
is the
exhaustibility of R, i.e. the natural scarcity. In phase 1, the relative scarcity index also
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Figure 4: Relative scarcity index
entails the additional scarcity |θ1|
λ
> 0, which represents the prospectively binding ceiling.
This additional scarcity enhances the scarcity of R and therefore increases the R&D
advantageousness, which corresponds with a decline in the number of A,K combinations
with feasibility of capital accumulation. In Fig. 4, the additional scarcity equals the
gap between mq3 and m
q
1. It widens, since the economy approaches the ceiling during
phase 1 implying a tighter restriction, which is reﬂected by mˆq1 > mˆ
q
3. The gap also
indicates the amount of R which would be used, if the ceiling does not exists. The wider
the gap the higher is the amount of not used fossil fuel. During phase 2 the additional
scarcity still exists but is reduced passively and possibly actively. In the ﬁrst case, R&D
investments are minimal and the relative scarcity index mq2 remains constant. Since fossil
fuel utilization is constant, the natural scarcity increases, reducing the gap between mq2
and mq3, i.e. the additional scarcity. In the second case, R&D investments are positive.
Therefore, utilization of the backstop increases, implying a decreasing share of R in the
energy mix. Since fossil fuel is less important, its relative scarcity declines. Hence, singular
or maximal R&D reduces the additional scarcity actively, establishing a second driving
force in addition to the passive reduction of additional scarcity. As backstop utilization
declines ceteris paribus with a lower scarcity index, the R&D advantageousness decreases.
To switch over to phase 3, the additional scarcity must be eliminated completely. This
follows directly from θ = µ = 0 in phase 3 and the smooth transition from one phase to
the next.22 The phase itself is equivalent to an economy without a ceiling.
Thus, the ceiling causes an increase in the scarcity of fossil fuel and thereby a reduction in
22See Appendix A.1 for a detailed proof.
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its usage during phase 1 and 2. Since the ceiling would be violated without the additional
scarcity, the result is quite intuitive. The additional scarcity increases as the pollution
concentration approaches the ceiling, indicating a smaller growth rate of R. At the ceiling,
the additional scarcity decreases due to the declining resource stock SR and possibly
increasing utilization of the backstop. The scarcity induced reduction of R causes an
increase in backstop utilization and therefore of R&D advantageousness. Consequently,
the advantageousness of capital accumulation declines.
The short-run eﬀects of the ceiling of the development path of an economy are am-
biguous. The ceiling does not only introduce the additional scarcity but can also alter the
initial shadow prices of capital λ0 and fossil fuel τ0 and therefore of the natural scarcity.23
However, if the initial shadow prices are suﬃciently similar, the following analysis holds.
We distinguish between poor economies with a low capital endowment and rich ones with
a high capital endowment. As stated in section 3.1.1 a poor economy which is located
below the SiP generally approaches the SiP with minimal R&D by capital accumulation.
Thus, its optimal investment choice is only aﬀected by the additional scarcity, if it reaches
the SiP during phase 1 or 2. In this case, the economy starts R&D at a lower capital
stock than an economy without the ceiling, i.e. earlier in its development process.24 In
other words, an economy is less developed or poorer when it starts R&D. Since the R&D
investments are not available for capital accumulation, the economy investments into the
capital stock are correspondingly lower. If an poor economy ignores the research option
at all (ii. exception from section 3.1.1) or is only accumulating capital during phase 1 and
2, its optimal investment choice is not aﬀected. However, due the increased use of back-
stop the energy costs are higher with the ceiling in the ﬁrst two phases. Therefore, less
net production is available for consumption and capital or R&D investments, which may
stretch the time period until the development process reaches the critical level allowing
R&D.
A rich economy which is located above the SiP can be aﬀected by the ceiling in two
ways. Generally, the economy approaches the SiP with maximal R&D. Since the ceil-
ing increases the backstop utilization, at least in early periods less net production can
be invested into research. Furthermore, the optimal investment decision is aﬀected, if
23A short analysis with respect to an altered λ is given below.
24Notice that "early" is here not revering to time but to the capital stock level.
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the economy would reach the SiP without the ceiling at a point in time that belongs
either to phase 1 or 2. As the additional scarcity increases the R&D advantageousness
by strengthen the decline of the SiP in time, the economy switches to singular research
at a lower capital stock level. This may extend the time period of maximal R&D. If this
time period is suﬃciently extended, it compensates for the lower net production such that
the economy switches to singular R&D at a higher development stage, i.e. with a higher
technology level. As above, more R&D investments imply that less investments are made
into the capital stock, or in the case of maximal R&D more capital is consumed. If the
economy conducts maximal R&D during phase 1 and 2 regardless of whether the ceiling
exists or not, i.e. if the economy is suﬃciently rich, the ceiling induced additional scarcity
lowers only the net production. In the case of minimal R&D above the SiP (i. exception
from section 3.1.1) the higher per unit energy costs may shorten the time period until the
economy reaches a steady state on the SSP.
In the long run an economy with a ceiling and one without a ceiling will exhibit the
same SiP (and SSP) after the resource stock SR is exhausted, because all energy is then
generated by the backstop. Therefore, the R&D advantageousness is the same in both
cases. This implies for the two standard cases from section 3.1.1 that the position of
the long run development path is not aﬀected by the ceiling. However, the position of a
constrained economy on the path may be diﬀerent from that of an economy without the
ceiling at some speciﬁc point in time. In case of the ii. exception, an poor economy does
not conduct R&D but converges to the SSP. Positive R&D would be only possible if the
relative scarcity reaches a level higher than that of an exhausted resource stock. However,
in this case fossil fuel is no longer used. Thus, if the additional scarcity had increased the
scarcity to this level, it would have been impossible to reach or stay at the ceiling, which
contradicts the fact that the economy must be in phase 1 or 2 to justify the additional
scarcity. However, the long run development may be aﬀected by the ceiling in case of the
i. exception. This rich economy follows a MRAP with minimal R&D investments above
the SiP. If the MRAP with minimal R&D is only a part of the development path, and was
preceded by a part with maximal R&D, higher (lower) net production in early periods
may cause a higher (lower) technology level and capital stock in the steady state.
The analysis of Chakravorty et al. (2006a) is based essentially on the scarcity of fossil
fuel, which translates directly into the price of the resource in a Hotelling model. To ex-
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plain a decreasing scarcity fossil fuel at the ceiling Chakravorty et al. (2006a) needed the
assumption of decreasing global energy demand. In the current model a rising (declining)
capital stock increases (decreases) energy demand.25 However, the backstop absorbs all
changes in total energy demand caused by a variation of the capital stock at the ceil-
ing.26 A decreasing scarcity is caused here by R&D, which increases the utilization of
the backstop. Consequently, the share of fossil fuel in the energy mix declines.27 The
opposite eﬀect of increasing scarcity at the ceiling cannot be explained, since there is no
possibility of increasing the share of fossil fuel in the energy mix. For this purpose, either
depreciation with respect to technology or a second technology that is related to fossil
fuel must be taken into account.
The development of the relative scarcity index together with Fig. 1 allows a qualitative
statement about the fossil fuel extraction path.
Proposition 4 During phase 1 (3) R decreases monotonically due to the increasing rela-
tive scarcity index mq1 (m
q
3) and the constant or decreasing unit costs of the backstop. On
the other hand, phase 2 is characterized by constant utilization of fossil fuel.
Figure 5 illustrates a corresponding fossil fuel path and a development path of the
emission stock which follows directly from the fossil fuel path.
Figure 5: fossil fuel extraction path and emission stock development
The extraction path denoted with Eb shows how the resource is extracted in the
25See Fig. 1.
26If b = 0, a decreasing (increasing) capital stock and therefore a lower (higher) energy demand implies
a lower (higher) scarcity to ensure E = E¯.
27Chakravorty et al. (2012) get a similar result due to a learning - by - doing eﬀect which decreases
the costs of the backstop.
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constrained economy. The other path, Eu, illustrates the path of an economy that is
identical with the constrained one at t = 0 but without the ceiling. Since the complete
resource stock must be used, both the area under Eb and under Eu equals SR. Thus,
the area marked with D1 represents the amount of fossil fuel that is not used at early
points of time in the constrained economy. Therefore, this amount must be used later
on. The corresponding area is denoted by D2. Because the areas under both paths are
equal, D1 = D2 must hold. Note that Eb must not lie below EU at t = 0. Since both
economies are identical at the starting time, this only happens if the relative scarcity
index mq1(0) =
τ(0)+|θ1(0)|
λ(0)
is greater than its equivalent of the economy without the ceiling
mqu(0) =
τu(0)
λu(0)
. Even if τu(0) = τ(0) holds, there are two possible eﬀects left. On the one
hand |θ1(0)| > 0 increases the numerator of mq1(0), indicating less usage of fossil fuel. On
the other hand λ(0) can be greater than λu(0). Due to (7) this implies lower consumption
in the constrained economy. If the reduction of consumption is large enough, the second
eﬀect outweighs the ﬁrst one and Eb(0) > Eu(0). In this case, the constrained economy
uses more fossil fuel and consumes less. Both imply a higher net income Y n, which can
be used for either capital accumulation or research. Thus, the economy tends to adjust to
the ceiling rather with strong measures than by gaining time to implement the necessary
measures. The latter happens rather if Eb(0) < Eu(0), as shown in Fig. 5. This solution
is the one intuition suggests, since it would be expected that a ceiling on the stock of
pollution, as an environmentally friendly measure, should decrease utilization of fossil
fuel. Therefore, if Eu(0) < Eb(0) holds, we have a kind of a green paradox.28 However,
in contrast to Sinn (2008a) and Sinn (2008b) the greater usage of fossil fuel is part of
an optimal path for the entire economy and does not violate the ceiling. If the intuitive
solution holds, the constrained economy will use more backstop, which implies a lower
net income. But the lower fossil fuel use extends the time period until the ceiling binds.
4. Market Economy
After having analyzed the (constrained) social optimum we turn to a market economy
in this section. We will show how fossil fuel tax needs to develop to ensure the ceiling. The
28The concept of the green paradox was introduced by Sinn (2008a) and Sinn (2008b) to describe a
situation where a tighter environmental policy on the demand side of the economy induces a higher supply
of polluting goods, therefore harming the environment instead of protecting it. The idea can be applied
here in a more general sense.
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economy consists of a great number of identical individuals and composite good producers
as well as two resource owning companies.29 The individuals own all companies in the
Y - and resource sector, as well as the capital stock. They maximize their intertemporal
utility with respect to their budget constraint. The companies in the composite good
sector rent capital and buy resources to generate energy. Since they do not face an
intertemporal problem, they maximize their proﬁt at every point in time. The two resource
owners sell the resources and, in the case of the backstop owning company, conduct
research. Therefore, they maximize their intertemporal proﬁt with respect to either the
resource stock or the technology. We assume a Cournot competition on the resource
market and perfect competition on all other markets. The government has the possibility
of taxing fossil fuel, with φ denoting the corresponding quantity tax rate. Additionally,
both resources can be subsidized with sR or sb, respectively. To balance the budget, the
government can levy a lump-sum tax or grant a lump-sum transfer, both denoted with
T S 0.
Given the described market structure, a representative individual faces the intertem-
poral optimization problem
max
C
∞∫
0
[
U(C)e−ρtdt
]
,
subject to K˙ =
r
pY
K +
pi
pY
+
pib
pY
+
piR
pY
+
T
pY
− C. (23)
The interest rate and the price of the composite good are represented by r and pY re-
spectively. pi, pib and piR denote the proﬁts of the composite good producers and the two
resource owners. From the necessary conditions λH = U ′(C) and λˆH = ρ− rpY we get30
Cˆ =
r
pY
− ρ
η
. (24)
λH represents the costate variable associated with the capital stock and η the (positive)
elasticity of U ′(C). The Ramsey rule (24) states that consumption will increase as long as
the real interest rate is greater than the time preference rate. According to λH = U ′(C),
the marginal utility equals λH , i.e. the price the individual would pay for an increase of
29The assumption of two resource owners and a Cournot competition is a simpliﬁcation of the well
known patent assumption in the endogenous growth theory. See for example Romer (1990). A more
complex model with several research ﬁrms would not alter the results.
30The current value Lagrangian as well as the necessary conditions are presented in Appendix A.2
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his capital stock. For an equilibrium on the composite good market λH = pY is necessary.
Otherwise, the individual would buy more (less) Y for investing in the capital stock and
consumption, if λH < pY (λH > pY ).
As mentioned above, the composite good producers do not have to solve an intertem-
poral optimization problem. Instead they maximize their proﬁt at every point in time.
Omitting a ﬁrm index and with pb and pR denoting the resource prices, the representative
producer's proﬁt is given by pi = pY F (K, b+R)− rK − pbb− (pR + φ)R. The ﬁrst order
conditions ∂F
∂K
= r
pY
and ∂F
∂x
= pb
pY
= pR+φ
pY
state that the marginal product of any input
has to equal its real price. Since the composite good producers have no market power,
these conditions hold, if the capital and resource market are cleared. By substituting r
pY
into (24) we get the socially optimal Ramsey rule (15).
The resource owners know the proﬁt maximization problem of the composite good
producers and therefore the price-demand functions for both resources pY Fx(K, b+R) =
pb = pR +φ.31 The proﬁts of the resource owners for each point in time are then given by
piR = [pY Fx(K, b+R)− φ]R− pYM(R) + sRR, (25)
pib = pY Fx(K, b+R)b−MbB(A)b+ sbb− pY I. (26)
The fossil fuel owner maximizes its discounted ﬂow of proﬁts with respect to SR ≥ 0 and
S˙R = −R ≤ 0. Appendix A.3 shows the current value Lagrangian as well as the derivation
of the ﬁrst order conditions. As long as fossil fuel is used, the ﬁrst order condition with
respect to R can be written as
Fx(K, b+R) = M
′(R)− Fxx(K, b+R)R + φ
pY
− sR
pY
+
τM
pY
. (27)
τM denotes the costate variable of the resource stock, which grows with the constant rate
ρ and is therefore determined by its initial value τ0M . Since the capital stock, the tax,
the subsidy and the price pY are exogenous to both resource owner and τM determined
by τ0M , equation (27) deﬁnes implicitly the optimal resource supply R∗ subject to the
amount of supplied backstop. Thus, the reaction function is given by R∗ = R∗(b).
Using the same approach for the backstop owner we get for b > 0:32
Fx(K, b+R) = MbB(A)− Fxx(K, b+R)b− sb
pY
. (28)
31For the resource owners the capital stock is a known but exogenous factor.
32The Lagrangian and the derivation of the ﬁrst order conditions can be found in Appendix A.3.
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(28) deﬁnes implicitly the optimal backstop supply subject to R and the technology level
A, which increases with the resource owner's R&D investments. We get b∗ = b∗(R,A).
The optimal R&D investments are given by the maximization of the Lagrangian with
respect to I, with κM denoting the costate variable of technology:
I∗ = 0, if − pY + κM < 0,
0 ≤ I∗ ≤ I¯ , if − pY + κM = 0, (29)
I∗ = I¯ , if − pY + κM > 0.
κM evolves according to κˆM = ρ +
pY
κM
MbB
′(A)b. By substituting R∗(b) and b∗(R,A) in
(27) and (28) respectively, the Nash - Cournot equilibrium is implicitly given:
Fx(K, b
∗(R∗, A) +R∗) =M ′(R∗)− Fxx(K, b∗(R∗, A) +R∗)R∗ + φ
pY
−
sR
pY
+
τM
pY
, (30)
Fx(K, b
∗ +R∗(b∗)) =MbB(A)− Fxx(K, b∗ +R∗(b∗))b∗ − sb
pY
. (31)
Table 1 summarizes and compares the results of the market economy with the socially
optimal solution. The Ramsey rule and the capital accumulation equation of the social
optimum are identical with the market equilibrium equations. To reveal the latter, we
substitute the proﬁt of the composite good producer, (25), (26) and the government's
budget constraint T = φR− sbb− sRR into K˙ = rpY K + pipY +
pib
pY
+ piR
pY
+ T
pY
−C. For the
further analysis we assume that the constrained social planner values capital, the resource
stock SR, and knowledge A in the same way as the subjects of the economy, which implies
λ = λH = pY , τ = τM and κ = κM . In this case the equations related to R&D are
identical. The ceiling has no eﬀect on the economy in phase 3, which suggests φ = 0.
Therefore, the optimal subsidies are determined by comparing the marginal products of
R and b of this phase. We get
sb = −pY Fxxb > 0, (32)
sR = −pY FxxR > 0. (33)
Using (33) we get for the optimal tax
φ(t) =

|θ1(t)|, if t ∈ [0, t1),
µ2(t)− θ2(t), if t ∈ [t1, t2),
0, if t ≥ t2.
(34)
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Proposition 5 The market equilibrium replicates the social optimum, if λ = λH , τ = τM
and κ = κM holds, the usage of both resources is subsidized according to (32) and (33),
and fossil fuel is taxed according to (34).
Due to (12) the tax increases during phase 1 at the rate ρ+γ, reﬂecting the increasing
emission stock, and therefore the tightening ceiling. In other words, as the emission stock
increases, the amount of possible new emissions decreases, implying a higher tax. During
phase 2, this amount is ﬁxed at E¯ = γS¯E. However, this does not imply a constant
tax but, (in the long run) a decreasing one, because the natural scarcity of fossil fuel
increases. Thus, the tax at the second junction point at t = t2 equals φ(t2) = 0. As the
growth rate of µ2 is variable, φ2(t) may increase as well as decrease. Nevertheless, Fig. 6
shows that the tax can only increase, if the composite good price pY grows fast enough.
In this case the growth rate of the natural scarcity τ
pY
is small, while the denominator of
Figure 6: Increasing tax during phase 2
φ
pY
increases. To comply with E(t) = E¯ the tax needs to increase. Since pˆY = ρ− FK , a
high capital stock is necessary for a suﬃciently high inﬂation rate. Due to the Ramsey
rule (24), a low marginal product of capital implies decreasing consumption. By using
φˆ2 = ρ + γ − µ2φ2 [ρ − µˆ2] we can show that consumption must indeed decline if the tax
increases. The tax increases if, and only if, FK + γ − µ2ψ [ρ− µˆ2]− γ τψ > FK − ρφ2ψ holds.
The left hand side equals mˆq2, which can only decrease or stay unchanged. Therefore,
0 > FK −ρφ2ψ and because of φ2 < ψ it follows FK −ρ < 0. According to the Ramsey rule
(24) FK − ρ < 0 implies decreasing consumption, which is only possible if the economy
lies above the SSP. Thus, during phase 2 the tax cannot increase in a suﬃciently poor
economy.
25
Proposition 6 The optimal tax increases during phase 1 due to the increasing emission
stock. Since the natural scarcity increases monotonically, the tax decreases to zero during
phase 2. If inﬂation is suﬃciently high, and consumption declines, the tax increases in
the short run of phase 2.
5. Conclusion
This paper analyzes the eﬀects on R&D and the capital stock of a ceiling on the pol-
lution stock. For this purpose we augment the endogenous growth model of Tsur and
Zemel (2005) with a polluting resource and a ceiling on the stock of pollution as known
from the literature following Chakravorty et al. (2006a). We show that the ceiling mainly
aﬀects the short run development of the economy by imposing an additional scarcity on
fossil fuel. Since the costs of the backstop can be reduced by R&D, the additional scarcity
increases the R&D advantageousness. If the ceiling does not aﬀect the natural scarcity,
the short run development is aﬀected in two ways. On the one hand, higher energy costs
decrease at least in early periods the amount of available production for capital or R&D
investments. On the other hand, the optimal investment decision is aﬀected, if the econ-
omy is neither too poor nor too rich. A poor economy will conduct R&D at an early
development stage. In a rich economy the period of maximal R&D may be extended
which can lead to a higher technology level. Consequently, both economies invest fewer
into the capital stock. As long as the economy conducts some singular R&D, the long run
development is hardly aﬀected by the ceiling. In other words, the long run development
path remains unchanged, whereas the position of the economy on the path to one speciﬁc
point in time may be altered. If R&D is omitted, the ceiling has also no eﬀect. The
ceiling may alter the steady state of the economy if and only if maximal R&D is canceled
in favor of minimal R&D.
As in Chakravorty et al. (2006a), Chakravorty et al. (2006b), Chakravorty et al. (2008),
Chakravorty et al. (2012) and Laﬀorgue et al. (2008), we are able to distinguish three time
phases. Analogous to Chakravorty et al. (2006a), the only sequence containing all three
phases starts with a non-binding ceiling that will bind later on to become and stay non-
binding afterwards. In contrast to the Hotelling models we can explain changes of total
energy demand endogenously by the variable capital stock. Similar to Chakravorty et al.
(2012) a declining resource scarcity at the ceiling is caused by an increasing technology
level. However, the necessary R&D is an explicit decision and R&D can be abandoned,
while Chakravorty et al. (2012) assumes a cost reducing learning-by-doing eﬀect. In both
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cases, the importance of fossil fuel for the energy mix vanishes as the utilization of the
backstop is intensiﬁed.
The optimal fossil fuel extraction path is aﬀected by the ceiling, since it exhibits a plateau
during phase 2. While intuition suggests a reduction of fossil fuel utilization at the start-
ing time to delay the moment the ceiling becomes binding, the results also permit some
kind of a green paradox. In this case, the natural scarcity of fossil fuel is aﬀected by the
ceiling and both fossil fuel utilization and non-consumed income are higher. This implies
greater investments in the capital stock and/or research to adjust to the ceiling.
We show that the social optimum is implemented by a market economy, if the government
subsidizes both resources to counter market power eﬀects resulting from Cournot compe-
tition on the resource market. Additionally, fossil fuel has to be taxed during phases 1 and
2 to comply with the ceiling. During phase 1, the tax increases monotonically, reﬂecting
the rising emission stock. During phase 2, the emission stock remains unchanged, while
the natural scarcity of fossil fuel increases, resulting in the tax being abolished at the end
of phase 2. If inﬂation is suﬃciently high, the tax can increase in phase 2 temporary. In
this case, consumption decreases which requires a suﬃciently rich economy. It is note-
worthy that the model does not support subsidies for the backstop that are granted for
pollution control reasons.
The presented model is rather a basic model, as it ignores several augmentations used
in the literature following Chakravorty et al. (2006a). These are abatement investments,
diﬀerently polluting exhaustible resources and limited carbon sinks. Especially the former
seems interesting as abatement may substitute for R&D. We have also ignored that the
amount of already used fossil fuel may inﬂuence the extraction costs. Concerning the
backstop one could assume a non-linear cost structure. Another promising research ﬁeld
is the endogenization of the ceiling by means of a speciﬁc damage function or, in a model
with multiple countries, by a multilateral bargaining process. By introducing a second
technology which associated to fossil fuel it would be possible to analyze the inﬂuence of
the ceiling on the direction of technical change.
27
A. Appendix
A.1. Junction points
The jump conditions for the costate variables at a junction point j which is charac-
terized by a ceiling that becomes binding (entry point) is33
Γ+(j) = Γ−(j) +B
∂[S¯E − SE]
∂ΓV
, B ≥ 0, (A.1)
with Γ = τ, θ, λ; ΓV being the associated state variable SR, SE, K as well as + and −
denoting the values just after and just before the junction point, respectively. It shows
that τ and λ are continuous while θ may jump. At a junction point where the ceiling
becomes non-binding (exit point) all costate variables are continuous.34 Due to (7), the
continuity of λ implies a continuous consumption path. Since the indirect approach is
used for (6), the jump condition can be written as35
θ+(j) = θ−(j) + µ+(j)− µ−(j) +Bθ, Bθ ≥ 0. (A.2)
Due to (16), µ = 0 during phase 1 and 3. In phase 3 the ceiling is non-binding and
will never be reached. Since pollution does not aﬀect production or utility directly, it
is then irrelevant for the social planner. Thus, θ must be zero. Therefore, the relative
scarcity index in phase 1, phase 2 and phase 3 is τ−θ
λ
, τ−θ+µ
λ
and τ
λ
, respectively. At a
junction point the used amount of exhaustible resources can exhibit a jump, because E is
a control variable. If the ceiling becomes binding at the junction point, a jump upwards
is prevented by the natural regeneration rate. If the ceiling becomes non-binding, the
ceiling itself prevents an upward jump. However, jumps downward are possible in both
cases. The necessary changes can be derived from Fig. 1. It does not matter whether the
backstop is used. As the demand function Fx and the marginal extraction costs function
M ′(E) are not aﬀected by a junction point, a sudden drop in E is only possible if the
relative scarcity index increases. Therefore, the following conditions must hold at junction
points between phase 1 and 2 as well as between phase 2 and 3.
• At a junction point t1 from phase 1 to phase 2:
τ−(t1)−θ−(t1)
λ−(t1)
≤ τ+(t1)−θ+(t1)+µ+(t1)
λ+(t1)
⇔ θ+(t1) ≤ θ−(t1) + µ+(t1)
33Cf. Feichtinger and Hartl (1986), p. 166 et seq.
34See Feichtinger and Hartl (1986), p.170.
35Cf. Chiang (1992), p. 300 et seq. and Feichtinger and Hartl (1986), p. 171-172.
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• At a junction point t2 from phase 2 to phase 3:
τ−(t2)−θ−(t2)+µ−(t2)
λ−(t2)
≤ τ+(t2)
λ+(t2)
⇔ µ−(t2) ≤ θ−(t2)
• At a junction point t3 from phase 2 to phase 1:
τ−(t3)−θ−(t3)+µ−(t3)
λ−(t3)
≤ τ+(t3)−θ+(t3)
λ+(t3)
⇔ θ+(t3) ≤ θ−(t3)− µ−(t3)
Substituting (A.2) shows that all three conditions must hold equally. This implies the
continuity of E, since the state variables capital K and technology A have to be contin-
uous, too. The total energy input depends only on K and A, so that its continuity, as
well that of b = x(K,A) − E(K,A), follows directly. Thus, both production factors are
continuous, which implies the continuity of Y . The one of consumption C results from
the continuity of λ and (7). Therefore, the economy switches smoothly from one phase to
the next.
If we denote the variables by the corresponding phase, we can rewrite the conditions at
the junction points as θ2(t1) = θ1(t1) +µ2(t1), θ2(t2) = µ2(t2) and θ2(t3) = θ1(t3) +µ2(t3),
respectively. Obviously, the ﬁrst and third conditions are identical. Thus, should there
be more than one junction point between phase 1 and 2, the conditions must hold for
two or more diﬀerent points in time. However, by solving (12) and (16) for θ1, θ2
and µ2, i.e. θ1(t) = θ01e(ρ+γ)t, θ2(t) = θ02e(ρ+γ)t − γµ02e(ρ+γ)t
∫
e−(ρ+γ)t+ρ
∫
ξ(t)dtdt and
µ2(t) = µ02e
ρ
∫
ξ(t)dt, with θ01 < 0, θ02 and µ02 > 0 as constants of integration and
ξ(t) ≤ 1, the conditions can be written as
θ02e
(ρ+γ)t − γµ02e(ρ+γ)t
∫
e−(ρ+γ)t+ρ
∫
ξ(t)dtdt = θ01e
(ρ+γ)t + µ02e
ρ
∫
ξ(t)dt
⇔ θ02 − θ01
µ02
= e−(ρ+γ)t+ρ
∫
ξ(t)dt + γ
∫
e−(ρ+γ)t+ρ
∫
ξ(t)dtdt, for t = t1, t3 (A.3)
and
θ02e
(ρ+γ)t − γµ02e(ρ+γ)t
∫
e−(ρ+γ)t+ρ
∫
ξ(t)dtdt = µ02e
ρ
∫
ξ(t)dt
⇔ θ02
µ02
= e−(ρ+γ)t+ρ
∫
ξ(t)dt + γ
∫
e−(ρ+γ)t+ρ
∫
ξ(t)dtdt, for t = t2. (A.4)
The right hand side of (A.3) and (A.4) is called Tf (t). It is continuous in time and
dTf
dt
< 0
for ξ(t) < 1. As long as the growth rate of µ is lower than the time preference rate, Tf
decreases strictly. In this case, both (A.3) and (A.4) hold only for one point in time, which
implies just one junction point between both phase 1 and 2 and between phase 2 and 3.
Furthermore, θ01 must be negative. Otherwise, the junction point between phase 2 and 3
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would be located before the junction point between phase 1 and 2 on the time line, which
is impossible due to the deﬁnition of phase 3. The only possible sequence containing all
phases is 1, 2, 3. In the case of ξ(t) = 1 the right hand side of (A.3) and (A.4) reduces to
zero. It follows θ02 = θ01 = 0. This implies that the emission path will be only tangent
to the ceiling. Therefore, this case is negligible.
The condition θ2(t1) = θ1(t1)+µ2(t1) reveals that θ jumps at the entry point, if µ(t1) > 0.
Since all costate variables are continuous at the exit point and θ = 0 in phase 3, the
corresponding condition θ2(t2) = µ2(t2) implies θ−(t2) = µ−(t2) = 0.
A.2. Individual
The current value Hamiltonian of the representative individual is:
H = U(C) + λH
[
r
pY
K +
pi
pY
+
pib
pY
+
piR
pY
+
T
pY
− C
]
(A.5)
The ﬁrst order conditions and the transversality condition are given by:
∂H
∂C
= U ′(C)− λH = 0 (A.6)
∂H
∂K
= λH
r
pY
= ρλH − λ˙H (A.7)
lim
t→∞
e−ρtλH(t)[K(t)−K∗(t)] ≥ 0 (A.8)
A.3. Resource Owners
The current value Hamiltonian of the ﬁrm owning the exhaustible resource is:
H = [pY Fx(K, b+R)− φ]R− pYM(R) + sRR− τMR (A.9)
The ﬁrst order condition as well as the transversality condition are given by:
∂H
∂R
= pY Fxx(K, x)R + pY Fx(K, x)− φ− pYM ′(R) + sR − τM = 0 (A.10)
∂H
∂SR
= 0 = ρτM − τ˙M (A.11)
τM(TR) = γSR (A.12)
γSR ≥ 0, γSRSR(TR) = 0 (A.13)
H(TR) =

≤ 0, if TR = 0
= 0, if 0 < TR <∞
≥ 0, if TR =∞
(A.14)
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TR denotes the point in time the resource stock SR becomes exhausted.
The current value Hamiltonian of the ﬁrm owning the backstop is:
H = pY Fx(K, b+R)b− pYMbB(A)b+ sbb− pY I + κMI (A.15)
The ﬁrst order condition as well as the transversality condition are given by:
∂H
∂b
= pY Fxx(K, x)b+ pY Fx(K, x)− pYMbB(A) + sb = 0 (A.16)
∂H
∂A
= −pYMbB′(A)b = ρκM − κ˙M (A.17)
lim
t→∞
e−ρtκM(t)[A(t)− A∗(t)] ≥ 0 (A.18)
The maximization of the Hamiltonian with respect to I gives:
I∗ = 0, if − pY + κM < 0 (A.19)
0 ≤ I∗ ≤ I¯ , if − pY + κM = 0 (A.20)
I∗ = I¯ , if − pY + κM > 0 (A.21)
The index ∗ marks the optimal value of the variable in question.
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